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CHURCH, STATE, AND THE PRACTICE OF LOVE
RICHARD W. GARNETr*

OD is love."'

In his first encyclical letter, Deus Caritas Est, Pope

%-.XBenedict XVI speaks movingly of "the love which God lavishes
upon us and which we in turn must share with others."2 This love, he
proposes, is the key to the "heart of the Christian faith," namely, "the
Christian image of God and the resulting image of mankind and its
destiny."' 3 That is, that "God is love" is not only the truth about God, it
also carries and illuminates the truth about us.
This love, Benedict explains, is also the essence of the Church. The
Church, the Pope explains, is a "community of love," a community whose
"entire activity ...is an expression of a love that seeks the integral good of
man[; that] seeks his evangelization through Word and Sacrament[; and
that] seeks to promote man in the various arenas of life and human activity." 4 Accordingly, he explores in his encyclical letter not only the "love
which God mysteriously and gratuitously offers to man," 5 but also, and
relatedly, the "ecclesial exercise" 6 and "organized practice ' 7 of love, by
and through the Church. He reflects on the relationship between this
practice, on the one hand, and the Church's "commitment to the just or* Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
This paper was presented at the First Annual Scarpa Conference, "From John Paul
II to Benedict XVI: Continuing the Re-Evangelization of Law, Politics, and
Culture," held on September 15, 2006 at the Villanova University School of Law. I
am honored and grateful for the invitation to participate in the Conference, and
to Professor Patrick Brennan, the John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies,
for his work, example and friendship. I appreciate the thoughtful comments and
suggestions received from Robert T. Miller, Fr. Robert Araujo, John Breen, Paolo
Carozza, Nicole Garnett, Rob Vischer, Michael Scaperlanda, Patrick Brennan,
Mark Sargent and Amy Uelmen.
1.1 John 4:16.
2. BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEus CARiTAs EST 1 (2006). The encyclical's theme came, apparently, as a surprise to some observers. See, e.g.,
Ian
Fisher, Benedict's First Encyclical Shuns Strictures of Orthodoxy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2006, at A6 (noting that Deus Caritas Est presents "Roman Catholicism's potential
for good rather than imposing firm, potentially divisive rules for orthodoxy").
Such obtuse reporting about things Catholic is, unfortunately, not uncommon,
even in our best newspapers. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, A Public Endfor an Extraordinary

Papacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, at A6 (describing funeral for Pope John Paul II
and noting that "[t]ucked under his left arm was the silver staff, called the crow's
ear, that he had carried in public").
3. BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 2,
1.
4. Id. 19.
5. Id. 1.
6. Id.
7. Id. 24.

(281)
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dering of the State and society," on the other.8 What does it mean, the
Pope asks, for church-state relations, for the public lives of Christians, and
for religious freedom under law, that charity "must animate the entire
lives of the faithful and therefore also their political activity" and that the
Church's practice of love and contributions to justice are and must be
"distinctive"?9
This Paper considers, among other things, the constraints and responsibilities that a meaningful commitment to religious freedom imposes
on governments. It is animated by Pope Benedict's claims, in Deus Caritas
Est and elsewhere, about both the Church and the state. In this letter, the
Pope shares his thoughts and teaching on who God is and on what it
means for us-and for the Church-that He is Love. This is, again, the
truth about God. But it is also the key to understanding the nature and
vocation of persons and of the Church. What's more, it has important
implications for the inescapably complicated nexus of church-state relations in our constitutional order.
The specific goal for this paper is to draw from Deus CaritasEst some
insight into what is a fundamental and-at present-the most pressing
challenge in church-state law, namely, the preservation of the Church's
moral and legal right to govern herself in accord with her own norms and
in response to her own calling.' 0 In constitutional law circles, this right is
often discussed in terms of churches' or religious groups' "autonomy." 1
While it is settled that churches enjoy constitutionally protected freedoms
to govern themselves and arrange their internal affairs in accord with religious teachings and authority, these freedoms' scope and theoretical justification remain unclear and contested. Considering also the increasingly
prominent conversation, within faith communities and also in the broader
public square, about the task of maintaining, or retrieving, the religious
character of religiously affiliated universities, schools, hospitals and socialservice agencies, the Pope's letter on love is as timely as its central theme is
timeless.
8. See id.
20, 29.
29, 34.
9. Id.
10. See id. ("[Rieligious communities rightfully claim freedom in order that
they may govern themselves according to their own norms[.]"); PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER GAUDIUM ET SPEs 76 (1965) ("[In their proper spheres, the political
community and the Church are mutually independent and self-governing."). Not
long ago, as part of a four-part series on the ways in which government accommodates religious entities by exempting them from otherwise applicable laws, the New
York Times carried a lengthy story focusing on church-autonomy questions. See Diana B. Henriquez, Where FaithAbides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2006, at B5.
11. E.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: FurtherReflections About
What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2007); Mark E. Chopko &
Michael F. Moses, Freedom To Be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church
Autonomy, 3 GEO.J. ON PovERTY L. & POL'Y 387 (2005); Douglas Laycock, Towards a
GeneralTheory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church LaborRelations and the Right to
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REx'. 1373 (1981).
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It is the teaching of the Church that the right to religious freedom is
rooted in the dignity of the human person and protects the individual
conscience from coercion in matters of religious belief. 12 This freedom,
the Church claims, "has its foundation not in the subjective disposition of
the person, but in his very nature." 13 That is, religious freedom is not a
function of what we want or prefer, but of who and what we are and what
' 14
we are for. It is a truth about who we are that we are, by nature, "social."
We are relational; we flourish in community. From our social nature, and
also from the nature of religion itself, the Church contends it follows that
the "freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which is the
endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as their right
when they act in community." 15 And so, "[p]rovided the just demands of
public order are observed, religious communities rightfully claim freedom
in order that they may govern themselves according to their own
norms."' 6 Finally, the Church claims for herself "that full measure of freedom which her care for the salvation of men requires. 1 7 Because of her

mission, and because of her "suprapolitical sacredness,"1 8 the Church demands recognition by the state, and treatment under law, as more than a
group, aggregation or association of free, individual believers.19
These are, to be sure, sweeping and controversial claims. Still, many
of them are consonant with American constitutional law, history and tradition. After all, as President Clinton once put it, "religious freedom is literally our first freedom." 20 The freedom of religion, it has been argued
12. See PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIGNITATIS HUmANAE 2 ("The right to
religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person[.]").
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

17. Id.

4.

13 ("In human society and in the face of government the Church

claims freedom for herself in her character as a spiritual authority, established by
Christ the Lord, upon which there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out
into the whole world and preaching the Gospel to every creature.").
18. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 203

(1960).

19. See Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatizationof
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771, 801 n.147 (2001) (noting that it would be "mistake to
reduce the Church to a mediating institution with a message, or a 'voluntary association with a cause' ") (quoting George Weigel, Papacy and Power, FIRST THINGS, Feb.
2001, at 18). Cf Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37, 51 (2002) (noting that "[t]he
task of any overarching theory of the constitutional status of religious entitles is to
identify and elaborate the reasons, if any, that justify treatment of religious enterprises different from secular organizations and from religious believers").
20. William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks on Religious Liberty in Vienna, VA, Religious Liberty in America (July 12, 1995). See generally THOMASJ. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1986); Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the "FirstFreedom"?, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1243 (2000).
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powerfully, was central to our Founders' vision for America." The Framers did not all agree about what, precisely, the "freedom of religion"
meant, but they all knew that it mattered. The same is true today. Although, as Noah Feldman has observed, the vast majority of Americans
profess to believe in God and cherish religious liberty, "no question divides Americans more fundamentally than that of the relation between
religion and government."2 2 Deus CaritasEst speaks to this question, and
maybe in a way that can begin to bridge this divide. And so, what does our
new Pope's work and thinking, about the future and present state of the
Church and her organized practice of love, suggest about the appropriate
content and vulnerable state of the rights and independence of religious
23
groups-and of the freedom of the Church?
1.
For the most part, there were few surprises in the press coverage of
the reactions to the election ofJoseph Cardinal Ratzinger to succeed Pope
John Paul II. The usual suspects from the standard camps were reported,
predictably, to be delighted, nervous or "petrified." 24 For example, Washington Post columnist E.J. Dionne worried that "Pope Benedict's vision of
the Church is that it should comprise a tough band of orthodox believers
who confront modernity and uphold the truths the Church teaches, with25
out any hesitations."
Much of the post-election commentary involved sound-bite accounts,
in ominous tones, of Ratzinger's work with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and superficial speculations about his election's implications for the various hot-button debates that so many in the media imagine
to be at the heart of the Church's life and teaching. Some of it, however,
latched onto several of Benedict's past statements suggesting that the
Church in the future will be "small," but perhaps more faithful to the Gospel. 26 These and similar reflections suggested to some that the new Pope
21. See generallyJOHN T. NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1998);JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

(2000).

22. NOAH FELDMAN, DMDED By GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEMAND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 5 (2005).

23. For more on the "freedom of the Church," see, e.g.,
Richard W. Garnett,
TheFreedom of the Church, 4J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2006). In brief, and inJohn
Courtney Murray's words, the "freedom of the Church" refers both to her "freedom as a spiritual authority" to carry out her "divine commission ... to teach, to
rule, and to sanctify" and to the freedom of the Christian people "to live within her
fold an integral supernatural life," a life with an "inherent suprapolitical dignity"
that transcends the goals and powers of the state and its temporal ends. See MURRAY, supra note 18 203-04 (1988).
24. Andrew Sullivan, Comment, Benedict Could PourPetrolon America's Cultural
Fires, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, at E4.
25. E.J. Dionne, Benedictus, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 2005, at 28.

26. SeeJOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, THE SALT OF THE EARTH: THE CHURCH AT
THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 256 (1997).
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wants "a more fervent, orthodox, evangelical church-even if it drives people away." 27 "If that means a smaller Church," Dionne reported, "with
squishy doubters or dissenters left by the wayside, so be it." 28 Many wondered, would the Church under Benedict be more a "remnant" than a "big
tent?" 29 Others had no doubt: the Pope's goal, warned Andrew Sullivan, is
"a smaller, leaner, rump church, dominated by ultra-conservative lay
groups such as Opus Dei." 30 A Pope who prefers a "leaner, smaller, purer
church," Professor Scott Appleby noted, 3 1 might well welcome the withering, or "evangelical pruning," 32 of the many Catholic institutionsschools, hospitals, universities, etc.-whose distinctively Catholic identity
has dissipated.
Much of this commentary now appears to have misunderstood or mischaracterized Cardinal Ratzinger's points, predictions and hopes. If we
want to understand or think usefully about the Pope's work and thought,
and about what it means for religious freedom, it makes sense to identify
and consider more carefully what he has said about the Church's nature,
mission, state and future.
In a 2003 interview, Cardinal Ratzinger was asked about Pope John
Paul II's often-expressed hope for a "new springtime for the Church." As
he had before,3 3 Ratzinger indicated both his admiration for the Pope's
I had foreseen then .

.

. that the Church would become small, that one

day she would become a Church comprising a small minority of society
and that she could then no longer continue with the large institutions
and organizations that she has but would have to organize herself on a

more modest scale.
Id.; see also John Allen, The Vatican's Enforcer: A Profile of CardinalJoseph Ratzinger,
NAT'L CATH. REP., Apr. 16, 1999, at A8 ("Ratzinger has often suggested that Christianity may need to become smaller and less culturally significant in order to remain
faithful.").
27. Peter J. Boyer, A Hard Faith: How the New Pope and His PredecessorRedefined
Vatican II, THE NEW YORKER, May 16, 2005, at 16; see also Ian Fisher, Benedict XVI and
the Church that May Shrink. Or Not, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A3.
28. Dionne, supra note 25, at 28.
29. Posting of Amy Welborn to open book, http://amywelborn.typepad.com/
openbook/2005/04/big tent v remn.html (Apr. 20, 2005).
30. Sullivan, supra note 24, at E4.
31. See "A Leaner, Smaller, Purer Church?",BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, May 2, 2005,

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_18/b3931074mzO54.htm.
32. ScottJaschik, EvangelicalPruningAhead?, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Nov. 3, 2005,

at 16 (quoting remarks by Archbishop Michael Miller, Secretary of Congregation
for Catholic Education, noting Pope's past suggestions that "it might be better for
the Church not to expend its resources trying to preserve institutions if their Catholic identity has been seriously compromised").
33. See, e.g., RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 16 ("IT]here are no mass conversions to Christianity, no reversal of the historical paradigm, no about face."); id. at
121 ("The historical hour is not turning around, nor is this star becoming compact
again, as it were, or returning to its accustomed size and luminosity."); id. at 148
(expressing reservations about significance of "mass demonstrations of Catholicism" that accompanied John Paul II's visits to United States); id. at 237 ("[T] he
Pope does indeed cherish a great expectation that the millennium of divisions will
be followed by a millennium of unifications."); id. at 238 ("The Pope's untiring
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hopeful vision and his own hesitation about embracing it. John Paul traveled the world, spoke to and inspired millions, and proclaimed time and
again the imminence of sweeping, transforming renewal. Ratzinger, however, voiced his doubts that
we will have in a near time buses of conversions, that all peoples
of the world will be converted to Catholicism. This is not the way
of God. The essential things in history begin always with the
small, more convinced communities .... This is springtime-a
34
new life in very convinced persons with joy of the faith.
These thoughts echo a theme that was explored more deeply in Cardinal Ratzinger's 1996 book, THE SALT OF THE EARTH: THE CHURCH AT THE
END OF THE MILLENNIUM. "[P]erhaps," he wondered, "the time has come
to say farewell to the idea of traditional Catholic cultures." "Maybe," he
suggested,
we are facing a new and different kind of epoch in the Church's
history, where Christianity will again be characterized more by
the mustard seed, where it will exist in small, seemingly insignificant groups that nonetheless live in an intensive struggle against
35
evil and bring the good into the world-that let God in.
Even if the Church should again find herself in "the position of the
mustard seed,... that is precisely what constantly rejuvenates it. Whether

it will again shape history as it did in the whole Middle Ages is something
no one can predict. But," he continued, "I am quite certain that it will
continue to be present anew and in new ways-also as a vital presence in
history-once again forming places of survival for mankind."3 6 "The
Church," he explained, "will assume different forms. She will be less identified with the great societies, more a minority Church; she will live in
small, vital circles of really convinced believers who live their faith. But
precisely in this way she will, biblically speaking, become the salt of the
37
earth again."
Pope Benedict returned to these predictions and images-"small, vital circles," the "mustard seed," the "salt of the earth"-in his recently published reflection on the religious foundations and secular state of
Europe. 38 Recalling Arnold Toynbee's understanding of civilizations and
activity comes precisely from his visionary power ....[But,] [w]hether this vision
is actually fulfilled is something we naturally have to leave entirely in God's hands.
At the moment, I do not yet see it approaching."); id. at 242 ("An absolute unity of

Christians within history is something I do not venture to hope for.").
34. Interview by Raymond Arroyo with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, EWTN
(Sept. 5, 2003).
35. RATzINGER, supra note 26, at 16.
36. Id. at 122.
37. Id.at 222.
38. See generallyJOSEPH RATZINGER & MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS: THE
REST, RELATIVISM, CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM

(2006).
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their development,3 9 he proposed that "Christian believers ... look upon
themselves as [one of those] creative minorit[ies]" on which the "fate of
society always depends. ' 40 It is important, he emphasized, to have "convinced minorities in the Church, for the Church, and above all beyond the
Church and for society." 4 ' These convinced, creative minorities of believers will, he hoped, re-enact the service of those monastic communities that
served Europe before as renewing "yeast,"4 2 and "help Europe to reclaim
what is best in its heritage and to thereby place itself at the service of all
43
humankind."
What should we make of all this? For starters, it should be clear that
only a superficial and prejudiced review could yield the regrettably common charge that Pope Benedict envisions or eagerly plans a purge of the
Church, a forced contraction to a smaller, more faithful ecclesial essence.
He has no illusions that a smaller and shrinking Church is or will be, for
that reason, a purer one. 44 Indeed, his concern seems less with doctrinal
dissent or behavioral missteps among believers than with "weariness," "resignation" and "hopelessness" in the world. 4 5 It is not so much that he is
angry about Christians' errors as he is saddened by their ennui. For all the
tired talk about Ratzinger the watchdog, enforcer, inquisitor or panzercardinal,a better interpretation of his statements about a smaller Church
and her "creative minorities" is that he is challenging us to embrace with
hope new possibilities for being in, ministering to, and evangelizing cultures that are, or affect to be, post-Christian.
At least three more observations might help to connect what Benedict
46
calls "the ecclesial exercise of the commandment of love of neighbour"
to the contemporary debates about, and challenges to, religious freedom.
First, the Pope is convinced that the Church, as the "mustard seed" and
"salt of the earth," will not and need not enjoy the exalted, even dominant,
public place and cultural role to which she might, in some places and
39. See id. at 80 (referring to ARNOLD JOSEPH TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY:
(D.C. Somerwell ed., 1987)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 120.
42. Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 80.
44. See RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 179 ("[A] purification does not take place
automatically simply because things decline."). We might recall here the scene in
Rob Reiner's classic mock-umentary, THIS Is SPINAL TAP, where the manager of a
fading heavy-rock band says, when asked if the group's bookings in small and obABRIDGEMENT OF VOLUMES I-VI

scure venues reflect a waning popularity, "no, not at all .... I just think that...
their appeal is becoming more selective." ROB REINER, THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Spinal

Tap Prods. 1984).
45. See RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 234 (discussing situation in formerly Communist countries of Europe and observing that "there is also no great awakening in

the sense that people are now saying: We must get back to Christian values.
Rather, a new weariness is setting in in souls, a dissipation, a resignation: hopelessness increases").

46.

BENEDICT

XVI,

DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note

2,

1.

288
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times, have become accustomed. 4 7 That is, "the Church will, in the fore48
seeable future, no longer simply be the form of life of a whole society[.]"
(And, of course, it has been a long time since the Church was "the form of
life of a whole society."). She will instead, present to the world, perhaps in
a modest, understated way, a "liveable alternative" and a "Christian model
of life."

49

Next-and, again, in contrast to all of the breathless, mindless chatter
about Benedict's imagined yearning for theocracy 5°-it is worth noting
his strong and firmly stated commitment to the distinct roles of, and necessary separation between, the institutions of religion and government.
This Pope is clear-eyed about the dangers that accompany "institutional
integration," and acknowledges readily that "the Church benefited by being forced to detach herself from the state Church systems." 51 He harbors
no illusion that Church's freedom and mission were always respected and
advanced by the "Catholic majesties" of centuries past. Indeed, he could
not have put the matter more clearly than he did in the recent encyclical:
"Fundamental to Christianity is the distinction between what belongs to
Caesar and what belongs to God, in other words, the distinction between
52
Church and State, or ... the autonomy of the temporal sphere."
Of course, this is nothing like an endorsement of what is often
presented as the heart of church-state separation, namely, a legally man47. See RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 126 ("[T]he relationship between society
and the Church will... continue to change, and it will presumably continue in the
direction of a dechristianized form of society."); see also id. at 127 ("[T]he public
function of the Church will no longer be the same as it was with the traditional
fusion of Church and society."); id. (noting that ours is "culture in which Christianity is not seen as a force determining the shape of things").
48. Id. at 164.
49. RATZINGER & PERA, supra note 38, at 125-26.
50. Were one to judge from the new releases table at the local Border's or
Barnes & Noble, one might think that "theocracy" is not only a live option, but has
arrived, at least in the United States. See, e.g., DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR AMERICA UNDER SIEGE 13-14 (2006) (warning that theocons's efforts, "to sanc-

tify and spiritualize the nation's public life, while also eliding fundamental
distinctions between church and state, the sacred and the secular," would "not be
fatal to the nation, but they would cripple it, effectively transforming the country
into what would be recognized around the world as a Catholic-Christian republic"); KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY: THE PERILS AND POLITICS OF OIL, RADICAL RELIGION, AND BORROWED MONEY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Xiii-Xiv (2006) (stating
that "strong theocratic pressures are already visible in the Republican national coa-

lition and its leadership, while the substantial portion of Christian America committed to theories of Armageddon and the inerrancy of the Bible has already made
the GOP into America's first religious party"); see also MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM 2 (2006) (explaining that Chris-

tian Nationalist movement seeks "a cultural revolution" and is "trying to train a
generation of leaders, unscathed by secularism, who will gain political power in
order to subsume everything-entertainment, law, government, and educationit"). Of course, it isn't, and hasn't.
RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 155 ("Excessively strong ties were always det-

to Christianity, or their version of
51.

rimental to the Church.").
52. BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARTAS EST, supra note 2,

28(a).
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dated and judicially enforced privatization of religion. This is nothing like
the frequent, facile assertions that moral claims and proposals relating to
the ordering of society through law are illegitimate if they reflect or are
rooted in religious conviction, or are advanced by religious believers. 53 It
is, instead, a reminder that it was, in fact, Christianity that brought "the
idea of the separation of Church and state" 54 into the world and "deprived
the state of its sacral nature .

. .

. In this sense," the Pope has insisted,

"separation is ultimately a primordial Christian legacy and also a decisive
factor for freedom."

55

Third, the Pope is and has been insisting that the Church's many,
varied institutions must be, or become, "imbue[d] with ecclesial spirit. '56
And, she should not retain or create institutions that she is unable to suffuse with that spirit.57 Unanimated institutions are just so much "ballast,"
he warns, and can "suffocate[ ]," rather than strengthen and structure, the
Church. 58 This third concern was also raised and explored in the Pope's
recent encyclical letter on the nature and practice of love. After noting
that love and its practice "needs to be organized if it is to be an ordered
service to the community,"5 9 he emphasized that this practice must not be,
nor be regarded as, merely a "welfare activity" in which the Church and
her organizations happen to engage. Instead, this practice is and must be
"an indispensable expression of her very being. ' 60 He then proceeded to
53. See, e.g., id. 29 ("The Church has an indirect duty [regarding the formation ofjust structures] . . . in that she is called to contribute to the purification of
reason and to the reawakening of those moral forces without which just structures
are neither established nor prove effective in the long run."); id. ("The direct duty
to work for a just ordering of society . . . is proper to the lay faithftil."); see also
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, A Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participationof Catholics in Political Life (2002) ("By fulfilling their civic
duties, guided by a Christian conscience, in conformity with its values, the lay faithful exercise their proper task of infusing the temporal order with Christian values,
all the while respecting the nature and rightful autonomy of that order.").
54. RATzINGER, supra note 26, at 239 ("Until then the political constitution
and religion were always united. It was the norm in all cultures for the state to
have sacrality in itself and be the supreme protection of sacrality.").
55. Id. at 240.
56. Id. at 173.
57. Cf Jaschik, supra note 32 (discussing Archbishop Michael Miller's recent
remarks at University of Notre Dame, where Archbishop "told a packed audience
•.. that the pope might favor 'evangelical pruning,' rather than maintaining ties to
institutions that have become too secular").
58. See RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 123.
Churches of the Christian countries are perhaps also suffocating on account of their own over-institutionalization, of their institutional power,
of the pressure of their own history ....
Christianity thus appears as traditional and institutional ballast that can't be jettisoned only because there
is still some recognition of the ancillary function it performs.
Id.
59. BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARiTAS EsT, supra note 2, 20; see also id. 24 (noting "how essential the early Church considered the organized practice of charity").
60. Id. 25(a); see also id. 29 ("The Church's charitable organizations ...

constitute an opus proprium, a task agreeable to her, in which she does not cooper-

290
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connect the Church's social teachings relating to her relationship to the
state and her place in the political arena, on the one hand, with an emphasis on the "distinctiveness" of the Church's practice of charity and
charitable institutions, on the other.61
The vision, then, of the Church that figures in the recent writings of
our new Pope is of a distinctive, independent, engaged community of love.
She is not a prominent and perhaps over-familiar piece of cultural furniture, and does not seek to bend culture and politics to her claims through
the sheer bulk and number of her institutions. She cooperates with, but is
not an arm of, the political authority. She is smaller than she was, and
different from the world, she has not abandoned it. Her organizations
and their members seek, above all-through "their words, their silence,
[and] their example... [to] be credible witnesses to Christ."6 2 What does
this vision mean for our inquiry into the content of, and challenges to, the
freedom of the Church? What are its implications for the re-evangelization of law, politics and culture?
II.
From the outset, Pope John Paul II put the Great Commission to
"teach all nations" 63 at the heart of his teaching and pontificate. He
urged Christians to be not afraid and to "open the doors to Christ." 64 In
contrast with Benedict's reservations, 65 the late Pope assured us that "God
is opening before the Church the horizons of a humanity more fully prepared for the sowing of the Gospel. I sense," he insisted, "that the moment has come to commit all of the Church's energies to a new
evangelization .... No believer in Christ, no institution of the Church can
' 66
avoid this supreme duty: to proclaim Christ to all peoples.
I have suggested elsewhere that John Paul II's emphasis on "missionary fervor," 6 7 and his constant proclaiming that the Church and Christians
ate collaterally, but acts as a subject with direct responsibility, doing what corresponds to her nature."); id.
31 ("[I]t is very important that the Church's
charitable activity maintains all of its splendour and does not become just another
form of social assistance.").
61. See id. 31; see also id. 31 (a) ("[T]he Church's charitable organizations
must be distinguished by the fact that they do not merely meet the needs of the
moment, but . . .dedicate themselves to others with heartfelt concern, enabling
them to experience the richness of their humanity."); id.
34 (stating that
Church's charity workers should "work in harmony with other organizations in
serving various forms of need, but in a way that respects what is distinctive about
the service which Christ requested of his disciples").
62. Id. 1 31(c).
63. Matthew 28:19-20.
64. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER REDEMPTORIS MISSIO 1 3 (1990).
65. For a discussion of Pope Benedict's reservations, see supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text.
66. JOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTORIS MISSIO, supra note 64, 3.
67. Pope John Paul II, Eucharist Mission, Message for World Mission Sunday
(Apr. 19, 2004).

2007]

THE PRACTICE OF LoVE

promote authentic human freedom by proposing the truth, connect in
68
interesting ways to First Amendment doctrines, precedents and values.
Near the heart of that Amendment's Free Speech Clause is a particular
human activity, namely, changing minds, our own and others'. The freedom of speech protected by our Constitution does not simply serve our
interest in expression; it is also about advocacy, persuasion and conversion. In fact, the paradigmatic First Amendment enterprise is not self-projection or pop-psychology-style actualization, but is instead a complex and
dynamic transaction in which what is taken to be true is proposed by the
one and then accepted or rejected by the other, thereby changing or
69
transforming him in a meaningful way.

John Paul II's celebration of missionary evangelism, and his insistence
that evangelization liberates the hearer, because it gives him the power to
say "no," was consonant with this free-speech theme.7 0 What's more, the
late Pope's understanding of evangelization as a generous, even promiscuous, invitation to "come over"7 1 to Christ was helpful to responding to a
particular, urgent challenge to the freedom of speech, namely, the increasing efforts by governments around the world to regulate religious
proselytism and conversion. 72 These efforts reflect, among other things, a
worry-one that certainly is well founded-that speech aiming to change
hearers' minds about religious truth is destabilizing and destructive, that it
unsettles political tranquility and established orthodoxies, and that it invades privacy and conscience. 73 However,John Paul II's unswerving belief
that religious freedom, properly understood, is not immunity from persuasion, and that, by "[p] roclaiming Christ and bearing witness to him," the
Church offers a liberating proposal, not a constraining imposition,7 4 is a
better response to these worries than insulating hearers from argument.
Turning back to Pope Benedict, it could be that his emphasis, in Deus
Caritas Est, on the Church as a distinctive, committed community of loveone that evangelizes the culture through the organized practice of love
and credible witness to Christ 7 5-speaks in a similarly helpful and timely
way to today's most pressing religious-freedom problem, that is, the articulation and defense of a constitutional church-autonomy principle that is
plausible and attractive in our historical and cultural context and that respects and protects the freedom of the Church.
68. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Changing Minds: Proselytism, Freedom, and
the First Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 453 (2005).

69. See id. at 458-65.
70. See id. at 471.

71. Id. at 466 (noting that words like "proselytize" and "proselytism" come
from Greek word, proselutos, meaning "one who comes over").
72. See generallyJohnWitte,Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & MARV L. REv. 707 (2001).
73. See Gamett, supra note 68, at 465-72.
74. SeeJOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTORIS MISSIO, supra note 64, 8.
75. See BENEDICT XVI, DEUs CARiTAS EsT, supra note 2, 31 (b).
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Is this challenge really so pressing, though? Certainly, it is widely regarded as "black letter" law that, in the words of one expert, "[c] hurches
...enjoy broad freedoms to organize themselves according to religious
doctrine" and that the Constitution affords "broad protections for
[churches'] rights to organize and operate in conformity with their internal law." 76 However, and although it is true that churches "plainly have
the right to organize and govern [themselves] according to religious principle, the scope of that right is increasingly contested,"7 7 and its theoretical and constitutional foundations uncertain. In case after case, and in all
kinds of ways, the freedom and autonomy of religious communities today
is challenged, even under attack.7 " Whether the dispute involves the supervision of diocesan finances by a bankruptcy court or administrative
agency, a requirement that religiously affiliated organizations pay for employees' contraception or that doctors in religiously affiliated hospitals
perform abortions, or a lawsuit challenging churches' and religious
schools' decisions about the hiring and firing of clergy and teachers, or
even the usurpation by China's government of the Church's ancient right
to select bishops, it seems that the church-autonomy question-and not
the words of the Pledge of Allegiance, or public displays of crosses on
hilltops and the Ten Commandments in parks-is the front line.
This uncertainty is connected, no doubt, to the limited, and dwindling, appeal in public discourse of "church autonomy." We are, generally
speaking, enthusiastic about autonomy, of course, but many of us are uneasy about connecting "church" with nomos. Matters are not helped by the
fact that the idea is often understood as entailing the implausible and
unattractive assertion that clergy and church employees are entirely
"above the law" and unaccountable for wrongs they do or harms they
cause. 79 And, the freedom of religious associations, communities and institutions is made more vulnerable by the link that many perceive between
church-autonomy principles, on the one hand, and-on the other-sexual abuse by clergy, venality and mismanagement by bishops, and dioceses' declarations of bankruptcy.8 0 To the extent the church-autonomy
76. Mark E. Chopko, Constitutional Reflections on the Parish: An Entity in

the Fabric of the Church (unpublished paper, on file with author).
77. See generally Chopko & Moses, supra note 11, at 387.
78. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriquez, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 1-3.
79. See, e.g., MARci A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE

OF LAw 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (contending that "[i]n recent decades,
religious entities have worked hard to immunize their actions from the law" and
"lobbying for the right to hurt others without consequences"); see also Brady, supra
note 11, at 6-7.
80. See, e.g., MARcI A. HAMILTON, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE CLERGYABUSE SCANDAL 2 (Apr. 10, 2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/2003

0410.html (arguing that "the so-called church autonomy doctrine is not really a
legal doctrine at all, at least as far as the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court are
concerned. Rather, it is an insidious theory that invites religious licentiousness
rather than civic responsibility").
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principle is thought to privilege institutions over individuals, or structures
over believers, its appeal will suffer, given that people today think about
faith-and, by extension, about religious freedom-more in terms of personal spirituality than of institutional affiliation, public worship and tradition. 8' We are-many of us, anyway-like the woman, Sheila Larson,
described by Robert Bellah and his colleagues in The Habits of the Heart,
who described her faith as "Sheilaism." 8 2 To the extent we approach religious faith as a form of self-expression, performance art or therapy, we are
likely to regard religious institutions as, at best, potentially useful vehicles
or tools or, more likely, stifling constraints or bothersome obstacles to selfdiscovery.
Nevertheless, churches' freedom-that is, the independence of religious communities from political control over their internal polity and
norms-is a vital dimension of any attractive notion of religious freedom.
If churches are not independent of the state, if they are not free to be
different from the state, and if the government not limited by churches'
freedom, then believers are not really free, either.
III.
On December 7, 1965, Pope Paul VI promulgated the Second Vatican
Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae.8 3 This
Declaration was at the same time one of the Council's most controversial
and most succinct achievements. The Council Fathers opened with the
observation that a "sense of the dignity of the human person has been
impressing itself more and more deeply on the consciousness of contemporary man."8 4 It is "in accordance with [this dignity] .

.

. that all men

should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth ....

to adhere to the truth once it is known, and to

order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth." 8 5 And, the
discharge of these obligations requires both the recognition and the pro86
tection of religious freedom.
Now, the Declaration provides nothing like a comprehensive theory
or account of what constitutional lawyers think of as church-state relations.
That said, its animating, foundational claim is the affirmation that "[t]he
81. See Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the
Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1645, 1662-65 (2004); see also
William Dinges et al., A Faith Loosely Held: The Institutional Allegiance of Young
Catholics, COMMONWEAL, July 17, 1998, at 16, available at http://www.findarticles
.com/p/articles/mi_ml 252/is-n 13_vl25/ai_20968205.
82. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE

221, 235 (Univ. Cal. Press 1996).

83. Portions of the discussion that follows are taken or adapted from an earlier work. See Garnett, supra note 23, at 68-73.
84. PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HurmANAE, supra note 12, 1.
85. Id. 2.

86. See id. ("This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right
to religious freedom.").
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right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the
human person[,]" not "in the subjective disposition of the person but in
his very nature."87 That is, attached to our "very nature" is the desireand the responsibility-to seek, find and adhere to the truth and, at the
same time, a moral immunity from external coercion in matters of religious conscience. 88 This immunity, in turn, ought to be secured through
constitutional limits on the powers of government,8 9 but also promoted
through policies that help "create conditions favorable to the fostering of
religious life." 90
It is important to emphasize that the Declaration speaks not only to
the freedom of individual religious conscience but also-and inextricably-to the freedom of religious communities and associations, and of the
Church. It states, for instance, that the "freedom or immunity from coercion which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also . . . their
right when they act in community." 9 1 Notice, though, that the claim is not
merely that individuals carry with them their own personal immunity from
coercion, or liberty of conscience, on those occasions when they choose,
as individuals, to engage in joint religious projects or exercises with other,
similarly immune individuals. The Declaration is not denying, of course,
that the rights of religious communities serve the free exercise of religion
by individual believers. But it is saying something more, too, and suggesting that the religious freedom of these entities is not entirely reducible
to that of the aggregated or collected individuals. "Religious communities," the Declaration affirms, "are a requirement of the social nature of
87. Id. 1 2, 9 ("The declaration of this Vatican Council on the right of man
to religious freedom has its foundation in the dignity of the person, whose exigencies have come to be are fully known to human reason through centuries of
experience.").
88. See id. 11 2, 3 ("The exercise of religion, of its very nature, consists before
all else in those internal, voluntary, and free acts whereby man sets the course of
his life directly toward God."); see id. 10 ("It is one of the major tenets of Catholic
doctrine that man's response to God in faith must be free[.] ... The act of faith is
of its very nature a free act.").
89. See id. I 1 ("The demand is likewise made [in addition to the demand for
dignity-grounded freedom of conscience] that constitutional limits should be set
to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the
rightful freedom of the person and of associations.").
90. Id. 5. The Declaration's premise that respect for religious freedom and
the immunity of religious conscience is consistent with government obligations
affirmatively to promote the good of religion fits uneasily, of course, with presentday constitutional doctrine regarding the First Amendment's prohibition on "establishment[s]" of religion. Cf id. 3.
[G]overnment ... ought indeed to take account of the religious life of
the citizenry and show it favor, since the function of government is to
make provision for the common welfare. However, it would clearly transgress the limits set to its power, were it to presume to command or inhibit
acts that are religious.
Id.
91. Id. 4.
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man and of religion itself."9 2 Accordingly, the coming together for worship, prayer, and so on is not simply an individual act that is somehow
"covered" by a believer's immunity from conscience. Religious freedom
involves more than non-interference by government in the content of individuals' beliefs; it is about more than privacy. Rather, the existence and
freedom of religious communities is, no less than the liberty of conscience
93
enjoyed by persons, rooted in the "nature of man[.]
The Declaration fleshes out the meaning, and fills in some of the content, of the freedom "rightfully claim[ed]" by religious communities to
"govern themselves according to their own norms." 94 More specifically
still, it proceeds from the rights of "religious communities" generally to
the freedom of the Church herself. Interestingly, it is not only for the
"good of the Church," the Declaration asserts, but also for the "welfare of
society here on earth," that "the Church should enjoy that full measure of
freedom which her care for the salvation of men requires. ' 9 5 This is, in
fact, "preeminent. ' 96 Indeed, this freedom is "the fundamental principle
in what concerns the relations between the Church and governments and
the whole civil order."97 At the core of this freedom is "the independence
which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission. ' 98 That mis99
sion, again, is the "organized practice of love."
Finally, and intriguingly, the Declaration asserts a link between the
Church's own freedom, and her own claim to "independence," with the
right of persons generally "not to be hindered in leading their lives in
accord with their consciences."' 0 0 That is, it proposes a "harmony," and
not a tension, between "the freedom of the Church and the religious freedom which is... the right of all men and communities and sanctioned by
constitutional law." 1 1 The Declaration invites us to regard the Church's
demands for self-government not merely as parochial, self-serving pleas for
special privilege, but more broadly, as claims about the constitutional
structure ofjust, limited governments and about whatJohn Courtney Mur92. Id.
93. Id. 5 ("The social nature of man and the very nature of religion afford
the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, cultural, charitable, and social organizations, under the impulse of their
own religious sense.").
94. Id. (explaining that religious communities have, among other things,
right not to be hindered or interfered with in "selection, training, appointment,
and transferal of their own ministers, in communicating with religious authorities
and communities abroad, in erecting buildings for religious purposes, and in the
acquisition and use of suitable funds or properties").
95. Id. 13.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. BENEDICT XVI, DEus CARITAS EsT, supra note 2,
100. PAUL VI, DIGNITATiS HUMANAE, supra note 12,

101. Id.

24.
13.
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ray called the "ontological structure of society." 10 2 The church-autonomy
principle provides a structural safeguard for others' religious and, indeed,
political freedom. 10 3 The understanding of constitutional governmentof its role, obligations and limits-to which the Declaration's defense of
religious conscience points is one that depends, fundamentally, on the
independence, autonomy and distinctiveness of the Church.
This theme of the structural importance of self-governing, independent churches to religious and political freedom runs through Pope Benedict's recent work. Echoing Dignitatis Humanae, he stated in Deus Caritas

Est that the state "must guarantee religious freedom" and that this freedom includes the recognition in law that the Church "has a proper inde10 4
pendence and is structured on the basis of her faith as a community."
As noted earlier, the Pope does not see an anti-religious ideology in
church-state separation, but a fundamentally Christian development that
liberates the Church and limits the state. 10 5 The Pope noted that American society, in particular, is
built on a separation of church and state that is determined and
indeed demanded by religion ....

In America the state is little

more than a free space for different religious communities to
congregate; it is in its nature to recognize and permit these communities to exist in their particularity and their non-membership
in the state. This is a separation that is conceived positively, since
it is meant to allow religion to be itself, a religion that respects
and protects its own living space distinctly from the state and its
ordinances. 10 6
In a regime of separation, properly understood, the state is not itself a
sacred power. It is simply an "order that finds its limits in a faith that
worships, not the state, but a God who stands over against it and judges
it."1 0 7 This "duality," or "separation and distinction of powers [has been]
of vital importance to the . . . development of Europe, and . . . laid the

foundations for the distinguishing characteristics of the West."10 8 Further102. MURRAY, supra note 18, at 199.
103. See Garnett, supranote 23, at 66 (" [I] ndependence for [religious] institutions and communities is both a feature of and a necessary condition for political
freedom."); see also PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 12, 13 ("The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations
between the Church and governments and the whole civil order.").
104. BENEDICT XVI, DEus CuzRrAs EsT, supra note 2, 28(a).
105. See id. (affirming that distinction between Church and State or "autonomy of the temporal sphere" is fundamental to Christianity); see also RATZINGER &
PERA, supra note 38, at 113 (noting that American bishops at Second Vatican Council contributed to Declaration by bringing to question "experience of the non-state
Church . . . as a Christian form that emerged from the very nature of the

Church").
106. RATZINGER & PERA, supra note 38, at 110-11.
107. RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 240.
108. RATZINGER & PERA, supra note 38, at 57.
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more, a free and separate Church provides a place to stand, a position
from which to critically engage the state. In THE SALT OF THE EARTH, Pope
Benedict stated that the world's recent experiences with repressive regimes confirmed that the Church can serve "as a counterpole; she is present as a worldwide communion, as a force against repression .... She
gives men a place of freedom and sets a sort of ultimate limit to oppression ....
[W]hen I stand up to a dictatorship," he explained, "I do so, not
just in my name as a private individual, but in virtue of an inner strength
that transcends my own self and my subjectivity."1 0 9 Through her juridical
separation from the political realm-though not, of course, her disengagement from public life or unconcern for the justice of the political
order-the Church actually helps and improves that realm. By being different, Benedict believes, the Church is a "source of energy that provides
what the state cannot have of itself .... Democratic society lives," in fact,
"by energy that it cannot produce itself."' 110

IV.
To sum up: Pope Benedict sees a future in which the Church is
smaller, her secular power erased, and her cultural presence understated.
At the same time, she is enriched by and enriching through her convinced, creative minorities and the distinctive, inspired institutions
through which she practices charity. In addition, he endorses the teaching of the Second Vatican Council that the independence and autonomy
of the Church, and of religious communities generally, are at the heart of
religious freedom and play an important, state-limiting role. The scope
and content of this freedom, though, are increasingly contested and
unstable.
To bring the exploration to a point, consider a specific, recent case:
Petruska v. Gannon University.1 11 Lynette Petruska was hired by Gannon
University-a Catholic institution in Erie, Pennsylvania-as the University's Director of Social Concerns in 1997. In 1999, she was made permanent chaplain. Because Ms. Petruska knew that the University had
109. Id. at 165. "This Church lives in all nations. It creates a communityabove and beyond all loyalty to one's own country-that spreads beyond national
borders." Id. at 115.
110. RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 271; see also Michael W. McConnell, The New
Establishmentarianism,75 CHI.-KENT L. Riv. 453, 456 (2000) ("The great weakness
of a liberal state is that it is dependent on cultural and demographic preconditions
over which it has no direct control.").
111. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006), vacated on
reh'g, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Petruska IF'). On June 20, 2006, the full Third
Circuit vacated the panel's decision and agreed to re-hear the case. See id. (noting
that original opinion of Third Circuit was withdrawn because judgment vacated on
rehearing). On September 6, a new panel handed down a new decision in the
case, and arrived at a different conclusion than had the original three judges. See
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Petruska IIF) (adopting
ministerial exception in dismissing Title VII discrimination claim); see also Henriquez, supra note 10, at Al (discussing procedural history of Petruska cases).
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promised her predecessor, Rev. Nicholas Rouch, that he could resume as
chaplain when he returned from studying in Rome, she requested and
received assurances from the University's president, Msgr. David Rubino,
that "she would not simply be replaced when Rouch returned or another
qualified male became available" and that "future decisions regarding her
tenure as chaplain would be based solely on her performance, not her
gender."1 12 In May of 2000, Msgr. Rubino resigned, after being accused
of sexual harassment and the University's provost, Dr. Thomas Ostrowski,
became Acting President. Ms. Petruska had helped to bring these accusations to the attention of Dr. Ostrowski and the local Bishop, and objected
strongly to what she regarded as their efforts to "cover-up" Rubino's mis113
conduct after he resigned.
When Rev. Rouch returned from Rome in July 2000, Bishop Trautman told Dr. Ostrowski that he had created a new University position, the
"Vice-President for Mission and Ministry," and that he had appointed
Rouch to fill it. He also directed Ostrowski to remove Petruska as University Chaplain. Ostrowski refused, and refused also to restructure the
Chaplain's Division by placing it under the administration of the new VicePresident for Mission and Ministry. When Ostrowski met with Petruska to
discuss the Bishop's plans and to assure Petruska of his own support for
her, he "conceded that the proposed action was being taken solely on the
114
basis of her gender."
Over the next year-and-a-half, Petruska, Rouch, Bishop Trautman,
and the new University President, Dr. Antoine Garibaldi, were engaged in
what, for brevity's sake, can be characterized as adversarial and sometimes
unedifying dealings relating to Petruska's role at Gannon University and
the structure of the Chaplain's Division. Finally, in October of 2002, Petruska resigned. After exhausting her administrative remedies, she filed a
lawsuit in federal court alleging, among other things, that the University
had demoted her because she is a woman and because she opposed sexual
harassment by University officials. The United States District Court dismissed the case concluding that the "ministerial exception" deprived it of
1 15
jurisdiction to adjudicate Petruska's claims.
On appeal, in an opinion by Judge Becker (now deceased), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged the
existence of the judicially-created "ministerial exception," which "exempts
religious organizations from employment discrimination lawsuits brought
by ministers. Grounded in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the United States Constitution, the ministerial exception was created to
protect church autonomy and avoid entangling government in religious
112.
113.
114.
115.
truska 1")

Petruska II, 448 F.3d at 620.
See id. at 7 (discussing facts of case).
Id. at 8.
See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 350 F. Supp. 2d 666 (W.D. Pa. 2004) ("Pe(dismissing complaint citing ministerial exception).
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affairs."1 1 6 Judge Becker concluded, though, that this exception is not
available in cases involving alleged discrimination unrelated to religious
teachings: "Employment discrimination unconnected to religious belief,
religious doctrine, or the internal regulations of a church is simply the
exercise of intolerance, not the free exercise of religion that the Constitu1 17
tion permits."
Most courts to consider the question, however, have concluded that a
religious institution's reasons for firing a minister or an employee charged
with religious duties are not relevant to the question of the ministerial
exception's availability.1 18 The Petruska II panel departed from this tradition and was confident that it could, without threatening religious freedom or overstepping the bounds of secular courts' authority, distinguish
the religious reasons a Catholic university might have for dismissing a female chaplain from those that are "simply put, sexist."1 19 The ministerial
exception, the Petruska II panel insisted, reflects the Constitution's solicitude for "religious exercise." The court "decline [d] to turn the Free Exercise Clause into a license for the free exercise of discrimination unmoored
120
from religious principle."
The panel decision in Petruska IIsparked a great deal of commentary
and debate.1 21 Then, after the death of Judge Becker, the full Court of
Appeals withdrew the panel's opinion and agreed to rehear the case
before a new three-judge panel. That panel affirmed, in relevant part, the
district court's decision. 12 2 Judge Smith, who dissented from the original
panel's decision, wrote for the court and agreed with the other federal
appeals courts that the ministerial exception "bars any inquiry into a religious organization's underlying motivation for [a] contested employment
116. PetruskaII, 448 F.3d at 620; see also Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of
Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Simply stated, the ministerial exception
insulates a religious organization's employment decision regarding its ministers
from judicial scrutiny under Title VII."); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
558-59 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood ....

Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a

matter of church administration and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selection.").
117. Petruska II, 448 F.3d at 620. "Petruska alleges that she was demoted because of animus against women that had nothing to do with religious beliefs, religious doctrine, or internal regulation." Id. at 32.
118. See id. at 15 n.7 (noting that Fifth Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and Eleventh
Circuit have recognized ministerial exception); see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious
Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. Rzv.
1633, 1652-54 (examining cases that addressed ministerial exception).
119. Petruska II, 448 F.3d at 620.
120. Id. at 33.
121. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, A Federal Trial Court Dismisses a Nun-Priest
Sexual Harassment Claim, FINDLAw's WRIT, Jan. 27, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw
.com/hamilton/20050127.html (calling PetruskaI "dubious case for invocation" of
the ministerial exception).
122. See Petruska III, 462 F.3d 294, 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (adopting ministerial
exception in dismissing Title VII discrimination claim).
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decision."' 23 "[L]ike an individual," Judge Smith observed, "a church in
its collective capacity must be free to express religious beliefs, profess matters of faith, and communicate its religious message. Unlike an individual
who can speak on her own behalf, however, the church as an institution
must retain the corollary right to select its voice."1 24 Accordingly, he continued, "any restriction on the church's right to choose who will carry its
spiritual message necessarily infringes upon its free exercise right to pro25
fess its beliefs."'
Judge Smith was right: "The First Amendment protects a church's
right to decide matters of faith and to declare its doctrine free from state
interference. A church's ability to select who will perform particular spiritual functions is a necessary corollary to this right." 12 6 Indeed, it would
seem almost the paradigmatic violation of religious freedom, and of
church-state separation, for the government or its courts to take up, let
alone to resolve, questions relating to religious entities' training, selection,
and dismissal of clergy. To protect the freedom of the Church from such
interference was, one might reasonably think, the whole point of the great
conflicts at Canossa and Canterbury.
There is, of course, a great deal that could be said about the reach
and theoretical foundations of the "ministerial exception" and about the
diffuse body of church-autonomy doctrine more generally. 127 PetruskaHis
only one of many cases that could serve to illustrate the vulnerability of an
understanding of church-state separation according to which the power of
the government over the internal polity and ministry of the church is lim123. Id. at 304 n.7.
124. Id. at 306.
125. Id. at 306-07. "The ministerial exception, as we conceive of it, operates
to bar any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution's right
to select who will perform particular spiritual functions." Id. at 307.
126. Id. at 312. It is worth noting that, in another case, decided only a few
weeks after Petruska II, another panel of the Third Circuit issued an opinion in a
case that presented issues similar to those raised in Petruska II, but that resolved
them differently. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc.,
450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (expressing concern about applying Title VII to employment decision of religious organization). Michele Curay-Cramer was fired
from her position as a teacher at a Catholic school after she signed her name to a
pro-abortion-rights advertisement in a local newspaper. See id. at 132-33 (discussing facts of case). Ms. Curay-Cramer filed a discrimination lawsuit and complained
that, among other things, the school had treated her more harshly than it had
treated men for "substantially similar conduct." Id. at 133 (discussing procedural
history of case). The court was reluctant, though, to "meddl[e] in matters related
to a religious organization's ability to define the parameters of what constitutes
orthodoxy." Id. at 141.
127. See, e.g., Brady, supra note 11, at 17 n.80; Chopko & Moses, supranote 11,
at 407-51 (discussing church autonomy); Laycock, supra note 11, at 1388-1414 (discussing church automony); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and
EcclesiasticalImmunity, 2004 BYU L. REiv. 1789, 1805-19 (2004) (discussing legal immunities of religious institutions); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 19, at 51 (discussing
distinctive legal treatment of religious entities).

2007]

THE PRACTICE OF LovE

ited. 128 For present purposes, the more specific question is, what might
Pope Benedict's statements in Deus Caritas Est and elsewhere about the
organized practice of love and the distinctiveness of the Church's charitable organizations suggest about decisions like Petruska II and institutions
like Gannon University?
For starters, it seems clear that the Petruska H panel's impulse to subject a Catholic university's employment decisions involving one of that university's most prominent religious ministers cannot be reconciled with the
freedom of religion expounded in the Declaration and embraced fully by
the Pope. That freedom, after all, includes the right of religious communities and institutions to "govern themselves according to their own
norms," 12 9 a right that would seem necessarily to encompass decisions
about how to interpret and apply those norms. Indeed, the Petruska II
court's glib pronouncement that the Constitution's Free Exercise Clause
protects only that free exercise of religion that is left over once "intolerance" and "sexis [m]" are excluded reflects a troublingly aggressive agenda
of remaking religion-or, some religions-to conform more closely with
the state's own norms.
As then-Cardinal Ratzinger once insisted, though, "[t]he Church is
not an organization among others or a sort of state within a state that
would thus have to be formed in exactly the same way as the state according to the same democratic rules of the game." 130 For the Church to be
free is to be free to be distinctive, different and separate from the state.
Ratzinger has warned, though, about the
development of what you might call a modern world view that
regards Christianity or the Catholic faith as an intolerant, antiquated affair unreconcilable with modernity and begins to apply
pressure. I believe that this peril is already rather great, even
though it still doesn't seem immediate. But the social pressure
on the Church essentially to conform to today's accepted stan3
dards already exists now.' '
In addition to an argument against the Petruska II panel's premises,
could it also be said that the Pope's work and thought suggests a critique
128. For more on the claim that, notwithstanding its black-letter status, the
church-autonomy principle is vulnerable, see Garnett, supra note 23, at 58.
129. PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 12, 4 (explaining that religious communities have, among other things, right not to be hindered or interfered
with in "selection, training, appointment, and transferal of their own ministers, in
communicating with religious authorities and communities abroad, in erecting
buildings for religious purposes, and in the acquisition and use of suitable funds or
properties").
130. RATZINGER, supra note 26, at 271.
131. Id. at 152. "Any future anti-Christian dictatorship would probably be
more subtle than anything we have known until now. It will appear to be friendly
to religion, but on the condition that its own models of behavior and thinking not
be called into question." Id. at 153.
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of Gannon University and its administrators? The Pope correctly notes
that the Church and her institutions must be free from intrusive, aggressive supervision in matters relating to the selection of ministers and the
content of teaching, but that does not mean that the Pope believes that
these institutions and clergy are beyond reproach and reform. The point,
after all, of religious freedom and church autonomy is not merely to insulate religious institutions from liability. It is not lawsuit-immunity for its
own sake. It is, instead, to protect the Church's ability to carry out her
mission. It is to enable the Church to serve as a faithful witness as it engages in the organized practice of love. The fact that the law does prevent
and should prevent the state from imposing its norms on the institutions
of the Church does not relieve these institutions from criticism nor from
the duty of self-examination with respect to how well they are responding
to the call that God has extended.
Recall the Pope's warning against the temptation of relying on sprawling, countless, Spirit-drained institutions for the organized practice of love
that is the Church's obligation and essence. Benedict has admitted that
"[t]he Church . . . needs, on the one hand, the flexibility to accept

changed attitudes and laws in society and to be able to detach herself from
the inter-connections with society that have existed until now. On the
other hand," he emphasizes, "she has all the greater need for fidelity in
order to preserve what enables man to be man, what enables him to survive, what preserves his dignity."1 3 2 It is true that lawsuits like Ms. Petruska's call for vigorous defense of the Church's independence. It is also
true, though, that they call for humble, critical examination and evaluation of the extent to which the Church is exercising her freedom under
law in a way that reflects the organized practice of love. Do institutions
like Gannon University, in cases like Petruska,witness faithfully to the God
who is love, or scandal? Are they imbued, as they should be, in order to be
worthy of the freedoms they enjoy, with a distinctive, "ecclesial spirit"? If
not, then what?

In Deus Caitas Est, the Pope states both that the Church "must practice love" and that "[l]ove needs to be organized if it is to be an ordered
service to the community."' 3 3 It is through the organized practice of love
and through the exemplary engagement of distinctive, faithful institutions
that the Church will, even if smaller, re-evangelize the culture, serving as
the salt of the earth.

132. Id. at 222.
133. BENEDICT XVI,

DEUS CARITAS EST, supra

note 2,

20.

